

The Proliferation Security Initiative

**GCC Tabletop Exercise
March 13, 2012**

Unclassified/For Official Use Only



Agenda



- **Welcome**
- **Purpose & Objectives**
- **Schedule**
- **Design Overview**
- **Procedural Guidance**



Purpose & Objectives

Purpose:

- Practical application of the Statement of Interdiction Principles
 - Explore how our countries may apply these principles in practice.
- Increase the understanding and capability of participant nations to take interdiction and post-interdiction actions within the PSI framework

Objectives:

- Examine legal authorities currently available for interdiction, detention, seizure, and disposition of items of proliferation concern
- Identify opportunities to strengthen national legal authorities
- Exercise decision-making processes under compressed timelines
- Identify opportunities and challenges to making policy and legal decisions to take action with limited and ambiguous information
- Explore information gathering and sharing within and between governments
- Demonstrate the benefits of cooperation within the context of the PSI



Schedule



- 11:35 – 11:45** *TTX Objectives and Scenario Overview*
- 11:45 – 12:15** *Move 1 Brief and Questions*
- 12:15 – 12:45** *Prayer*
- 12:45 – 13:05** *Excursion 1 and Discussion*
- 13:05 – 13:35** *Move 2 Brief and Questions*
- 13:35 – 13:55** *Excursion 2 and Discussion*
- 13:55 – 14:30** *Expanded Discussion and Wrap-Up*



Design Overview




A WMD-related interdiction scenario that:



- Poses a series of general questions that will form the basis of a plenary discussion
- Will ask participants to develop and share a position, that includes a desired outcome and an action plan
- Will pose additional, moderated “what if” questions that highlight potential interdiction occurrences
- Will encourage participants to discuss positions, share insights, and elicit best practices to identify potential opportunities to strengthen cooperation and legal authorities pertaining to WMD-related interdictions.



Design Overview



KEY

-  Plenary Discussion - all
-  Game Discussion



Procedural Guidance



- Scenario is fictional and was developed to meet TTX objectives
- To encourage openness and free discussion, all player produced products and plenary discussions are to be considered for *non-attribution*
- The presentations and comments of the participants will not be collected or analyzed and are only for use in this exercise.
- The game materials are yours to take with you and use as desired.
 - You may find them useful if you subsequently elect to design and run an interagency TTX in your capital.

Scenario Overview





General Questions



- Given the situation presented in the scenario, what actions would your government consider?
- Which government departments would normally be involved?
- Which commercial organizations might need to be involved?
- What additional information would you consider necessary to better form and develop national courses of action?

These questions should be considered at all points during the scenario.



Baseline Facts



- You are **Country GREEN** in this scenario.
- The date is March 13, 2012.
- You have been asked by a PSI partner to interdict a controlled dual-use commodity to prevent it from going to a WMD program in a State of proliferation concern – **Country RED**.
- You will be asked to discuss the questions and present national positions during this scenario.




Initial Situation Report

A PSI Partner provides the following information:

- A controlled, dual-use commodity is in a container onboard a vessel which will arrive today in **Port Green**, a seaport in your country.
- The container has a final destination of **Port Red** in **Country RED**.
- You will be the last country able to take action on this shipment before it reaches its final destination.
- The PSI Partner advises that the dual-use commodity is on an [IAEA control list](#) and is being shipped in violation of a [United Nations Security Council Resolution](#).
- The shipment did not originate with this PSI Partner. They are providing the information based on “reliable” intelligence.







Situation Report: Update 1



The PSI Partner provides the following additional information:

- The dual-use commodity is onboard the [M/V Sea Breeze](#), which has just arrived today in **Port Green**.
- The suspect shipment is in container [TRLU6181109](#), a consolidated shipment of goods exported from **Country ORANGE** to **Country RED**.
- Within container TRLU6181109 is a shipment of *milled machine parts* from *Gefra Milling* in **Country ORANGE**, which, according to the [bill of lading](#), are destined to *Ishnav Manufacturing* in **Country RED**.
- The PSI partner indicates that the shipment from *Gefra Milling* actually contains a [CNC 5-axis milling machine](#), which is a controlled commodity destined to *Kasrav Industries* in **Country RED**, in violation of [UN Security Council Resolution 2020](#).






Questions: Move 1



Based on the additional information you have received:

- If the suspect container were in-transit (remaining onboard the *M/V Sea Breeze*), under what national legal authority, if any, would you be able to order the off-loading of the container in your seaport?
- If the *M/V Sea Breeze* had not been scheduled to transit your seaport, but was redirected into port by the flag state, how would that change your authority to order the off-loading of the container?
- Under normal circumstances, what information would vessel owners/agents be required to present on shipments which are in-transit through your seaport and remaining onboard the same vessel?
- What agencies (military, customs, law enforcement, etc.) would be involved in the interdiction at this point in the scenario?

Excursion 1: Transshipment





Excursion: Transshipment



“What if” a *PSI Partner* provides the following information:

- A controlled, dual-use commodity is in a container onboard currently onboard M/V Sea Breeze, a vessel which is currently in **Port Green**..
- M/V Sea Breeze will return to **Country ORANGE** in two days on a regularly scheduled route.
- The container in question is scheduled to be off-loaded from M/V Sea Breeze in **Port Green** and loaded onto a different vessel for further transport to **Port Red** in **Country RED** .
- You will be the last country able to take action on this shipment before it reaches its final destination.
- The PSI Partner advises that the dual-use commodity is on an [IAEA control list](#) and is being shipped in violation of a [United Nations Security Council Resolution](#).
- The shipment did not originate with this PSI Partner. They are providing the information based on “reliable” intelligence.



Excursion Questions




- Would the fact that the cargo in question is being transshipped through Port Green affect your ability to seize the shipment at this point, and if so, under what legal authority?
- If you seized the shipment, what options would you have to ultimately dispose of the shipment and under what legal basis?

End of Move 1

QUESTIONS & DISCUSSION


Move 2





Baseline Facts: Update

- You are **Country GREEN** in this scenario.
- The date is March 17, 2010.
- You have been asked by a *PSI partner* to interdict a controlled dual-use commodity to prevent it from going to a WMD program in a State of proliferation concern – **Country RED**.
- The suspect container that may have a controlled dual-use commodity inside is in **Port Green**, a seaport in **Country Green**.
- All documents from Move 1 pertain to Move 2 and should be used as part of the decision process for Move 2.





Situation Report: Update 2



- Container [TRLU6181109](#) is a consolidated shipment of goods being exported from **Country ORANGE** to **Country RED**. The container arrived on the [M/V Sea Breeze](#) into **Port Green**, a seaport in your country .
- Within container TRLU6181109 is a shipment of *milled machine parts* from *Gefra Milling* in **Country ORANGE**, which, according to the [bill of lading](#), is destined to *Ishnav Manufacturing* in **Country RED**.
- The PSI partner indicated that the shipment from *Gefra Milling* actually contains a [CNC 5-axis milling machine](#), which is a [controlled commodity](#), and is destined to *Kasrav Industries* in **Country RED**, in violation of [UN Security Council Resolution 2020](#).






Questions: Move 2



Based on the additional information you have received:

- Under what national legal authority and circumstances would you be able to screen, open, and inspect the container?
- Based on the information discovered during the exam, would you detain the shipment for additional inquiry, seize it outright, or release it back to the vessel owner/agent? Under what legal authority would you take this action?
- What agencies would determine, from a technical standpoint, if the commodity in question was in fact on the control list? How would they make this determination?
- What additional information would be needed to further the inquiry/investigation into this matter, and what agencies would carry out that inquiry/investigation?

Excursion 2: Re-Export





Excursion: Re-Export

- **“What if”** :Country Green’s customs authorities review all documents presented by the vessel owner/agent and conduct a screening inspection of container TRLU6181109 using a mobile container scanning device.
- The scanning image reveals 5 large crates among other packages. Inside the crates there appear to be machine parts and packing material.
- Country Green’s port authorities note that seal number 55660088 is still intact on the container door. They break the seal & open the container for inspection.
- The container is unloaded and the five crates pertaining to House Bill of Lading OFF987-6554 are separated. The remaining packages are re-stuffed inside the container and the container is resealed and released to the vessel owner/agent for onward travel to Country RED.
- The crate labeled “1 of 5” has a partially torn shipping label affixed to the outside indicating it is from *Dimani Manufacturing* of Country BLUE, and is destined to *Gefra Milling* in Country ORANGE. Opening the crate reveals an envelope with a shipping document inside. that identifies Country ORANGE as the final destination of the original shipment from Country BLUE



Excursion Questions



- Would you be able to seize the shipment at this point, and if so, under what legal authority?
- If you seized the shipment, what options would you have to ultimately dispose of the shipment and under what legal basis?
- If in this scenario there was no violation of your law, but a request were made by Country BLUE to seize the shipment and return it to Country BLUE as a violation of its law, would you be able to seize the shipment? If so, under what authority/arrangements?
- How would the claim for damages be handled?

End of Move 2

QUESTIONS & DISCUSSION

Backup Slides

Vessel Data Sheet

M/V Sea Breeze



Vessel Name	M/V Sea Breeze
IMO Number	9151888
Registration Number	NB 3652 291
Call Sign	P3WZ9
Ship Type	Break Bulk Cargo/Container
DWT	8,965
Year Built	1999
Flag	Cyprus
Crew	21
Crew Nationality	Latvian (3), Filipino (13), Korean (5)

Current Voyage - S760:

Port Orange	ARR 23-01-10	DEP 25-01-10
Port Green	ARR 27-01-10	DEP 28-01-10





Shipping Document

Dimani Manufacturing CNC 5-Axis Milling Machine

Model: DMNI-7500

Machine specifications

Item		DMNI-7500
Travel	X-axis travel <longitudinal movement of saddle>	1,400 mm (55.1 in.)
	Y-axis travel <vertical movement of spindle head>	1,200 mm (47.2 in.)
	Z-axis travel <cross movement of table>	1,200 mm (47.2 in.)
	A-axis travel	150°(+30° to -120°)
	B-axis travel	360°
Table	Pallet working surface	630 × 630 mm (24.8 × 24.8 in.)
	Pallet loading capacity	800 kg (1,760 lb.)
	Max. workpiece height	850 mm (33.4 in.)
Spindle	Spindle speed	20 – 8000 rpm
Control System	Semper, Faraway, Herchel	

Manufactured by Dimani Manufacturing, Blue City, Country Blue



Vessel Manifest

M/V Sea Breeze

Voyage S760

Container	Contents	Shipper	Consignee
TRLU6181109	FAK (SLAC)	Orange Freight Forwarders Orange City, Country Orange	Red Consolidators Red City, Country Red
B/L Number	House Bills	Port of Origin	Port of Destination
LGAA12345678-0	12	Port Orange	Port Red
Seal Number	Hazardous Goods	Weight	Size
55660088	No	18,000 kg	40'

Definitions:

B/L: Bill of Lading

FAK: Freight all Kinds

SLAC: Shipper's Load and Count



M/V Sea Breeze

House Bill of Lading

BOL Number	House Bill	Exporter	Consignee
LGAA12345678-0	OFF987-6554	Gefra Milling Orange City, Country Orange	Ishnav Manufacturing Red City, Country Red
Packages	Contents	HTS	Hazardous Goods
5 crates	Milled machine parts	8409.99.10	No
Weight	Instructions: Contents fragile Contact Ishnav Manufacturing for pickup		
10,000 kg			



United Nations Security Council Resolution 2020

Acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

3. *Decides* that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to, or for the use in or benefit of, Country RED, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology which could contribute to enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery, namely:

(a) those set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 2, if the State determines that they would contribute to enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;

10. *Decides* that all States shall freeze the funds, other financial assets and economic resources which are on their territories at the date of adoption of this resolution or at any time thereafter, that are owned or controlled by the persons or entities designated in the Annex,

Annex:

A. Entities involved in the nuclear programme:

1. *Kasrav Industries*



IAEA INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 2

1.B.2. Machine tools, as follows, and any combination thereof, for removing or cutting metals, ceramics, or composites, which, according to the manufacturer's technical specifications, can be equipped with electronic devices for simultaneous "contouring control" in two or more axes:

b. Machine tools for milling, having any of the following characteristics:

- 1. "Positioning accuracies" with all compensations available better (less) than 6 μm according to ISO 230/2 (1988) along any linear axis (overall positioning);**
- 2. Two or more contouring rotary axes; or**
- 3. Five or more axes, which can be coordinated simultaneously for "contouring control".**

Note: Item 1.B.2.b. does not control milling machines having both of the following characteristics:

- 1. X-axis travel greater than 2 m; and**
- 2. Overall "positioning accuracy" on the x-axis worse (more) than 30 microns according to ISO 230/2 (1988).**

